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Abstract 
In an emerging literature, informal institutions or culture has been defined based on four important traits - TRUST, 
RESPECT, CONTROL and OBEDIENCE. This paper investigates the question - do informal institutions, defined by 
these traits, enhance women's political, social and economic rights? A simple empirical analysis reveals that informal 
institutions or culture is a determinant of women's rights.
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1. Introduction 
Women's rights, which are a component of human rights in general, have undergone 
substantial changes over the past decades. Almost all aspects of women's rights - 
economic, political or social, have been redefined and remolded over this time. 
According to Coleman (2004), discrimination in aspects of political participation and 
school enrollment has gone down steadily. Further, gender gaps in important facets like 
infant mortality rates and literacy levels have also narrowed. Yet, this statement cannot 
be generalized for all countries in the world. According to a report published by the 
World Economic Forum (2005)
1, many developing countries, along with some developed 
nations, rank poorly in terms of eliminating gender gaps.  
Among other factors, the institutional framework of a society largely impacts such 
rights. For example, an extensive range of literature has supported the view that 
democratic institutions
2 support human rights and, further, enhance them. Thus, 
institutions which have been laid down by rules, or commonly known as formal 
institutions, play a major role in creating, shaping and/or bettering human rights for a 
society. Yet, informal institutions or what is more loosely defined as norms and culture 
can also play an important role in defining such rights. This paper explores this particular 
association - do informal institutions, or what we define as culture, contribute towards 
enhancement of women's rights?   
Informal institutions or culture encompass a wide range of aspects. As a result it 
is very hard to define culture in a concrete fashion since it could include a variety of 
societal facets ranging from how people behave to what they eat to what they wear and so 
on so forth. As in Guiso et. al. (2006), culture “is so broad and the channels through 
which it can enter economic discourse so ubiquitous (and vague) that it is difficult to 
design testable, refutable hypotheses”. Although an accurate measure of culture has still 
not been defined in the literature, an extensive survey data has made it possible to come 
up with a decent measure of informal institutions or culture. Tabellini (2007) identifies 
some distinct traits from the World Value Survey (WVS) and European Value Survey 
(EVS) based on which a proxy for informal institutions or culture has been used in the 
literature. Since the focus of this paper is to empirically measure the association between 
informal institutions and women's rights, I consider this particular measure of culture, 
though many other aspects of culture can affect such rights. 
The traits or attributes identified in the literature as the defining characteristics of 
culture of a nation can have substantial influence over the rights of women. One such 
trait, TRUST
3, implies whether people in general trust other people. But TRUST can also 
work towards enhancement of women's rights. Lower TRUST leads to greater monitoring 
and transaction costs. In societies with lower TRUST levels, people do not participate in 
broader anonymous market transactions but rather trade among known small networks, 
developing rigid and narrow outlook and, thus, are prone to carry out unfair practices 
                                                 
1 According to the report, countries like Sweden, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia as well as some East 
European Nations like Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have succeeded in narrowing the gender gap to a huge 
extent. Yet, nations like Costa Rica, Pakistan, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, India and many others have shamelessly 
failed in removing or lowering gender gaps.  
2 Beetham (1999) stresses that „human rights constitute an intrinsic part of democracy‟ based on the sole fact that 
democracy define basic freedom of individuals which is a pre-condition for voices of the populace to be effective 
in public sphere. 
3 It has been shown in the literature that higher trust in a society lowers transaction cost which, in turn, facilitates 
market exchange and result in efficient outcomes (Fukuyama 1996, Dixit 2004). Greater trust has also been 
shown to promote secure property rights because it reduces the cost of monitoring (Williamson and Kerekes 
2009). 
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against women. Greater TRUST levels lead to efficient outcomes as people become 
conscious about women‟s position in the society. Further, women themselves realize that 
they need to lead a more respectful life in the society. Thus, greater TRUST leads to 
generation of more favorable informal institutions which supports women's political, 
social and economic rights.  
  In the same way, another trait, RESPECT affects enhancement of women‟s rights. 
RESPECT implies the degree of tolerance and respect among individuals. An array of 
literature on violence against women has associated economic dependency of women 
with incidents of violence. The studies have shown that increased economic dependency 
is linked with greater incidences of violence against women( See, Gelles (1976), Roy 
(1977), Kalmuss and Straus (1990) and Basu and Famoye(2004)). Such attitudes indicate 
lower respect towards women‟s status in society. As people develop trust for individuals 
outside their close circle, their RESPECT for all individuals, including women, improve.  
The third trait, CONTROL, implies the extent of freewill possessed by an 
individual.  Greater CONTROL makes individual hard working. They become conscious 
of the status of women and the importance of their contribution in the society. Thus, 
improvements in women‟s rights are achieved over time. 
OBEDIENCE is the fourth and final trait capturing the level of obedience in a 
society. It is measured as the percentage of respondents within a country answering that 
obedience is an important quality for children to learn. Based on similar arguments 
presented in the development literature, OBEDINECE should have a negative impact on 
women‟s rights. Higher the level of OBEDINECE in a society, the more efficient will be 
the passing on of ideas and culture over generations. Since older generations prefer and 
adhere to conservative and rigid outlooks, higher OBEDIENCE will have a negative 
impact on women‟s rights. 
  The analysis of this paper is deeply rooted in sociological and anthropological 
studies on rights and culture. Hernandez – Truyol (2004) suggest that cultural practices 
can be interpreted or employed in the erroneous way as a justification for violating 
women‟s rights.  „Culture‟ should be critiqued so that it can be used as a tool for 
protection of women‟s rights. Thus, the author claims that cultural practices should be 
molded so that they can protect and enhance women‟s rights. Merry (2001) suggests that 
„rights are a cultural phenomenon, developing and changing overtime in response to a 
variety of social, economic, political and cultural influences‟. The author mentions that 
over decades, the meaning of human rights has changed substantially from its original 
meaning being deeply rooted in liberal theory, to a broad notion which is strongly and 
intricately connected with collective, cultural
4, social and economic rights. Cowan, 
Dembour and Wilson (2001) examine how understanding and evaluating human rights is 
„approached itself as a cultural process‟.   
Literature has usually focused how democracy or formal institutions enhance 
human rights and, therefore, rights of women. Missing from the literature is an empirical 
analysis of the impact of culture on rights of women – in particular, the impact of the 
traits of culture which have been identified in the literature. This paper endeavors to fill 
up this missing link. The results of the paper show that better informal institutions work 
towards enhancement of women's rights. Both OLS and robust regression specifications 
confirm the findings. The results are robust to the inclusion of various controls. 
                                                 
4 Based on a study on India, Basu (1993) shows that, while there is strong association between culture and 
women‟s status, there is also a linkage between women‟s status and demographic welfare.    3 
 Section 2 discusses the data used in the paper. The empirical specification and 
the benchmark results are described in Section 3. Section 4 talks about robustness issues 




Data for the analysis has been taken from various sources. The dependent variables of the 
paper are different proxies representing women's rights. The different rights considered 
are women's economic, political and social rights.  The data source is The Cingranelli-
Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. It „contains standard-based quantitative 
information on government respect for 15 internationally recognized human rights for 
195 countries, annually from 1981-2007‟.  The data description is provided in detail in 
Appendix 2. 
The main explanatory variable of the paper is informal institutions or culture. The 
variable used to measure culture or informal institutions has been first identified by 
Tabellini (2007) and Williamson and Kerekes (2009) has expanded the variable later.  As 
stated by Knowles and Weatherston (2006), the definition of informal institutions should 
capture multiple aspects which encompass norms, conventions, grass-roots institutions 
and trust.  Tabellini
5 has identified some important traits in an attempt to capture the 
above mentioned aspects. These four important traits are TRUST, RESPECT,CONTROL 
and OBEDIENCE.  
These cultural traits are measured by utilizing survey data from the European 
Values Survey (EVS) and World Values Survey (WVS). These surveys capture culture in 
the form of individual beliefs and values reflecting local norms and customs (The EVS 
Foundation and the WVS Association 2006).  The data for the paper has been taken from 
Coyne and Williamson (2009). In order to maximize sample size Coyne and Williamson 
(2009) pool all countries surveyed in any of the five waves over the time periods 1981-
84, 1989-1993, 1994-1999 and 1999-2004.  The proxy for culture is constructed by 
summing TRUST, CONTROL, and RESPECT and subtracting the OBEDIENCE score.  
Several control variables are used in all the specifications. Norms and culture 
differ to a great extent based on regional characteristics and, thus, they should play an 
important role in the evolvement of the same. Thus, regional dummies
6, based on World 
Bank classification, have been considered. For example, women's rights in terms of 
economic, political and social issues can differ a lot in countries of MENA
7 compared to 
countries which belong to South Asia. The other controls used are religious affiliations, 
initial schooling and proxies of formal institutions.   
Variables to capture the extent of growth and development are also controlled for 
in alternate specifications. For the benchmark specifications, Gross domestic  product 
(GDP) of the initial period of the sample (1981), growth of GDP of the same period and 
initial population have been used. As robustness checks, years of schooling of initial 
periods, 1960 and 1970, various proxies of formal institutions and religious affiliations 
have also been included in the specifications.  
 
                                                 
5 Other literature, which has argued that TRUST, RESPECT and CONTROL, are important for social interaction 
and encourages production and entrepreneurial initiatives are Harper (2003) and Lane (1991). 
6 The regional dummies are Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA), Europe and Central Asia (EAC), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) and South Asia (SA). 
7 For example, according to UNICEF, State of the World's Children, 2007, the discrepancy of pay between men 
and women is much higher in MENA countries (5 percent in U.S. 2003 dollars) than South Asian countries (0.5 
percent in U.S. 2003 dollars).   4 
3. Methodology and Benchmark Results  
 
For the specifications, cross-country regressions have been used. Informal institutions or 
culture take some time to change and may impact outcomes in the society gradually over 
time. Cross country regressions consider long term changes and, thus, are the appropriate 
models to use. Another, reason to have a cross-country specification is to avoid 
endogeneity issues. It is not hard to think that women's rights can also have an impact on 
informal institutions or culture.  Presence of efficient rights and non-existence of all 
unfair practices against women should bring a positive change in norms and culture
8. As 
all aspects of women‟s rights – social, economic and political, gain importance among 
masses, they shed their conservative and rigid outlooks. Thus, there is an overall change 
in attitude, norms, beliefs, and, thus, in culture. As McAdam (1994) mentions, while 
explaining the association between social movements for human (women) rights, gay 
rights and so on, the causation can run both ways. Just as social movements are shaped by 
culture, social movements and, thus, redefined rights have their impact on culture as well.  
To avoid this bias of reverse causality in the regression, initial (values for 1989) 
values of the aggregate culture variable have been used. Averages of women‟s rights 
proxies have been considered. Due to fewer observations for the year 1989, averages of 
informal institutions have been used for the other specifications which should also help to 
overcome the endogeneity bias. Before running empirical specifications, the association 
is represented by means of scatter plots. Figure 1 shows the scatter plots when initial 
1989 values of informal institutions or culture is used. For all the scatter plots, the 
association is positive. The empirical specification is as follows: 
 
                                                                            
 
where         implies women's economic, political or social rights.          represents 
the aggregate index of informal institutions.    represents the matrix for controls and    
represents the vector for regional dummies.    represents the random error term. 
In Table I, the results are presented. As stated, the 1989 aggregate index figures 
are considered. While columns (1) to (3) present ordinary least square (OLS) results, 
columns (4) to (6) present robust regression
9 specifications. The results show that 
informal institutions have a strong impact on all types of women's rights. The problem 
with these specifications is that there are only 39 observations. So these specifications are 
run without including any controls. In order to maximize the set of observations, average 
of informal institutions over the period 1984 to 2004 is considered. The results are 
presented in Table II. To start with, the results are again run by considering informal 
institutions as the only explanatory variable. Again, the conclusion is the same – informal 
institutions affect women's rights strongly.  Similar to Table 1, both OLS and robust 
regression specifications are considered. 
In Table III, more controls are added. The controls added are regional dummies, 
formal institutions of 1981 and log of years of schooling of 1960. Democratic
10 
                                                 
8 Culture, as stated before, is multifaceted and nuance. At the same time, the linkages between culture and 
women‟s rights are multidimensional too. Many aspects of such an association have not been captured and are 
beyond the focus of this paper.   
9 Robust regression analysis help to control the bias generated due to the presence of outliers. Such specifications 
attach least weight to outliers. 
10 Poe, Tate and Keith (1999) have claimed in their paper that high levels of democracy and high economic 
development are supportive of human rights. Women's rights, being a part of human rights, should be affected by 
the same variables as well.   5 
institutions should have significant positive impact on rights for women. Initial values are 
considered since better democratic institutions in the past should provide the 
infrastructure for evolvement of women's rights over time. Proxies for economic 
development have been considered later. Further, a better educated citizen should also 
have more respect towards women's status in the society. As the results in Table 3 shows, 
the coefficients of rights for women lose their significance in the case of economic rights 
but remain significant for the other two. While the coefficient of democracy is significant 
in the case of economic rights, it is not significant in the case of political and social 
rights.  In columns (4) to (6), a variable indicating extent of institutionalized constraints 
on the decision making powers of the chief executive, is used as a proxy for formal 
institutions, instead of democracy.  Initial (1960) values are considered. The variable 
ranges from 1 to 7 with higher values indicating more constraints on the chief executive. 
The conclusions remain unchanged but the variable itself is not significant.  
In Table IV, more controls are added. These controls are proxies for religious 
affiliations. Individuals belonging to different religions have separate viewpoints about 
women's status in society and accordingly women's rights will be defined. Among the 
religious affiliation variables, Muslim population has a negative impact on all types of 
rights but the impact is not significant. In alternate specifications, averages for 
democracy
11 and schooling are considered and conclusion is unaltered. The results are 
reported in Appendix 1. For the OLS specifications, the coefficient of Muslim population 
is significant in the specifications for economic and social rights but for robust 
regressions, the coefficient is only significant for social right specification. 
For the same set of specifications, gross domestic product (GDP) of 1981, GDP 
growth of the same year and population of the same year are included. Initial values of 
these macroeconomic and development variables should affect the pattern of human 
rights development of women over time. Coefficients for all three types of rights are 
significant (results not reported).  
As mentioned before, the aggregate index is constructed based on the four traits. 
To delve into deeper analysis, the benchmark specifications are rerun by considering 
OBEDIENCE as the proxy of informal institutions or culture. OBEDIENCE is the 
negative trait among the four traits and, thus, the results would put forward an interesting 
perspective about the negative impact of a facet of culture on women‟s rights. The results 
are presented in Table V. Though the results are identical with OLS specifications, the 
robust regression results are reported .The coefficient of obedience has a negative impact 
on all types of women‟s rights. In columns (4) to (6), TRUST is included along with 
OBEDIENCE. While TRUST has a positive impact on all three types of rights, 
OBEDIENCE has a negative impact. 
 
4. Robustness Analysis 
 
To confirm the findings, several robustness tests have been carried out. The specifications 
are rerun with different proxies of formal institutions. The idea is to check, that whether 
controlling for other types of formal institutions, takes away the significance of informal 
institutions. Table VI
12 presents the results. Two proxies of schooling are included in the 
                                                 
11 While the democracy average ranges over the period 1970 to 1994, the schooling average is over the period 
1960 to 1985. 
12 Columns (1) to (4) control for Initial (1970) Schooling and column (5) to (8) control for schooling average 
over the years 1960 to 1985. The different proxies of formal institutions are as follows: (A) column (1) and 
column (5) control for democracy average over the period 1970 to 1994; (B) column (2) and column (6) control 
for autocracy average over the period 1960 to 1990; (C) column ( 3) and column ( 7) control for initial (1970)   6 
specifications. The results reported are for social rights. For columns (5) to (8), which 
control for schooling average, the coefficient of social right is weekly significant (p 
ranging from 0.10 to 0.11). The results are almost identical
13 for political right while the 




The paper stresses the importance of culture in the development process of women‟s 
rights. As the populace in a society develops more Trust, Respect and Control (the 
positive traits of culture), they become conscious about the position of women in society 
as well as their contributions,  and, thus rights of women improve over time. The paper 
stresses while efficient formal institutions should be articulated for defining and shaping 
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Figure 1: Scatter Plots - The association between Women’s Rights and Culture 
 
A.  Economic Rights 
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Table I: Cross Sectional Specification: The Impact of Informal Institutions on 




Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Table II: Cross Sectional Specification: The Impact of Informal Institutions on 
Women’s Rights (With Informal Averages) 
 

























             
Informal   0.181***  0.119***  0.271***  0.188***  0.106***  0.290*** 
  (0.0216)  (0.0214)  (0.0331)  (0.0250)  (0.0158)  (0.0376) 
Constant  0.719***  1.398***  0.406***  0.715***  1.489***  0.333** 
  (0.0988)  (0.0980)  (0.152)  (0.111)  (0.0698)  (0.166) 
             
Observations  89  89  89  89  89  89 
R-squared  0.354  0.261  0.377  0.395  0.344  0.406 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 


































             
Informal( 1989)  0.123**  0.145***  0.180**  0.141***  0.144***  0.206*** 
  (0.0471)  (0.0331)  (0.0821)  (0.0465)  (0.0289)  (0.0732) 
Constant  1.095***  1.402***  1.028**  1.019***  1.425***  0.901** 
  (0.256)  (0.159)  (0.469)  (0.251)  (0.156)  (0.395) 
             
Observations  39  39  39  39  39  39 
R-squared  0.180  0.409  0.155  0.199  0.400  0.177   10 
Table III: Controlling for Initial Formal Institutions and Schooling 
 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  












  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Informal  0.0465  0.0992*  0.0922**  0.0432  0.133**  0.113** 
  (0.0326)  (0.0511)  (0.0440)  (0.0349)  (0.0523)  (0.0471) 
Formal   0.0303*  0.00736  0.0254  0.0261  -0.0122  -0.00952 
  (0.0175)  (0.0176)  (0.0201)  (0.0251)  (0.0274)  (0.0321) 
Schooling (1960)  -3.16e-05  -0.0661  -0.0882  -0.0382  -0.0622  -0.0265 
  (0.0904)  (0.131)  (0.135)  (0.112)  (0.161)  (0.149) 
Intercept  1.510***  1.680***  1.787***  1.729***  1.604***  1.842*** 
  (0.221)  (0.211)  (0.304)  (0.152)  (0.175)  (0.258) 
             
Observations    40  40  40  39  39  39 
R-squared  0.907  0.554  0.888  0.876  0.540  0.863 
 
Table IV: Controlling for Religious Affiliations 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  


















             
Informal  0.0531*  0.113**  0.119**  0.0603  0.137**  0.0980 
  (0.0287)  (0.0543)  (0.0545)  (0.0419)  (0.0651)  (0.0644) 
Formal  0.0287  0.0105  0.0271  0.0262  -0.00875  -0.0110 
  (0.0185)  (0.0231)  (0.0255)  (0.0269)  (0.0248)  (0.0360) 
Schooling (1960)  -0.0520  -0.0282  -0.113  -0.107  -0.0506  -0.0186 
  (0.116)  (0.192)  (0.222)  (0.149)  (0.220)  (0.197) 
Catholics  -0.000175  0.000371  -9.97e-05  0.000500  0.000731  -0.000839 
  (0.00160)  (0.00302)  (0.00338)  (0.00160)  (0.00219)  (0.00312) 
Muslims  -0.00189  -0.00120  -0.00501  -0.00228  -4.30e-05  -0.00199 
  (0.00208)  (0.00521)  (0.00522)  (0.00253)  (0.00448)  (0.00403) 
Constant  1.583***  1.489**  1.662**  1.730***  1.527***  1.992*** 
  (0.292)  (0.624)  (0.659)  (0.211)  (0.351)  (0.451) 
             
Observations  38  38  38  36  36  36 
R-squared  0.902  0.564  0.883  0.870  0.556  0.864 
 
Notes: All specifications are run with regional dummies. Columns (1) to (3) controls for initial (1981) 
values of democracy while columns (4) to (6) control for initial (1960) executive constraints  
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Table V: Controlling for Obedience and Trust 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












             
Obedience   -1.076**  -0.474*  -1.892***  -0.977**  -0.404  -1.846*** 
  (0.425)  (0.266)  (0.504)  (0.408)  (0.286)  (0.486) 
Trust         0.00914*  0.0121***  0.0119* 
        (0.00510)  (0.00358)  (0.00608) 
Muslim  -0.00522**  -0.00533***  -0.00843***  -0.00321  -0.00445***  -0.00785*** 
  (0.00239)  (0.00150)  (0.00284)  (0.00228)  (0.00160)  (0.00272) 
Catholics  -0.000101  -0.000809  -0.000225  0.00108  0.000238  0.00146 
  (0.00221)  (0.00138)  (0.00262)  (0.00227)  (0.00159)  (0.00270) 
Formal  0.0505***  0.00319  0.0895***  0.0518***  0.00619  0.0748*** 
  (0.0161)  (0.0101)  (0.0191)  (0.0164)  (0.0115)  (0.0195) 
Constant  1.757***  2.196***  2.020***  1.404***  1.795***  1.653*** 
  (0.193)  (0.120)  (0.228)  (0.257)  (0.180)  (0.306) 
             
Observations  42  42  42  42  42  42 
R-squared  0.519  0.447  0.693  0.564  0.544  0.726 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
VARIABLES                 
                 
Informal  0.109*  0.112**  0.168**  0.123**  0.0930  0.0404  0.102  0.0819 
  (0.0549)  (0.0489)  (0.0636)  (0.0502)  (0.0557)  (0.0542)  (0.0628)  (0.0489) 
Formal  0.00960  -0.0864  -0.0176  -0.0126  0.0219  -0.469***  0.00001  0.108** 
  (0.0254)  (0.135)  (0.0312)  (0.0496)  (0.0250)  (0.133)  (0.0296)  (0.0450) 
Schooling   -0.0297  -0.0483  -0.113  -0.0284  0.146  0.176  0.00387  0.0630 
  (0.173)  (0.178)  (0.207)  (0.182)  (0.266)  (0.233)  (0.227)  (0.240) 
Catholics  -0.000828  -0.000583  0.000338  -0.000669  -0.000485  0.000366  -0.000857  0.000372 
  (0.00278)  (0.00266)  (0.00298)  (0.00267)  (0.00280)  (0.00264)  (0.00285)  (0.00266) 
Muslims  -0.00589  -0.00565  -0.00462  -0.00597  -0.00753**  -0.00683*  -0.00962***  -0.00817** 
  (0.00434)  (0.00437)  (0.00397)  (0.00407)  (0.00358)  (0.00347)  (0.00261)  (0.00310) 
Constant  1.778***  1.869***  1.726***  1.845***  1.316**  1.872***  1.835***  1.033* 
  (0.422)  (0.437)  (0.405)  (0.461)  (0.596)  (0.503)  (0.423)  (0.583) 
                 
Observations  45  44  41  45  50  50  38  50 
R-squared  0.877  0.877  0.854  0.877  0.796  0.835  0.859  0.821 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Notes: Regrassand: Social Rights. Columns (1) to (4) control for Initial (1970) Schooling and column (5) to 
(8) control for schooling average over the years 1960 to 1985. The different proxies of formal institutions 
are as follows: (A) column (1) and column (5) control for democracy average over the period 1970 to 1994; 
(B) column (2) and column (6) control for autocracy average over the period 1960 to 1990; (C) column ( 3) 
and column ( 7) control for initial (1970) executive constraints; (D) column (4) and column (8) control for 
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Appendix 1: Controlling for democracy average and schooling average 
 


















  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
Informal  0.0433  0.0895**  0.0930  0.0645*  0.0689**  0.107* 
  (0.0400)  (0.0383)  (0.0557)  (0.0370)  (0.0333)  (0.0559) 
Formal (average)  0.0222  0.00142  0.0219  0.0117  -0.00581  0.0144 
  (0.0188)  (0.0127)  (0.0250)  (0.0174)  (0.0157)  (0.0264) 
Schooling 
(average) 
0.0504  0.0852  0.146  0.0195  0.0396  0.0904 
  (0.134)  (0.114)  (0.266)  (0.167)  (0.151)  (0.253) 
Catholics  -0.00115  0.000809  -0.000485  -0.000335  0.00178  -0.000176 
  (0.00174)  (0.00179)  (0.00280)  (0.00160)  (0.00144)  (0.00242) 
Muslims  -0.00351*  -0.00318  -0.00753**  -0.00321  -0.00310  -0.00748* 
  (0.00188)  (0.00216)  (0.00358)  (0.00272)  (0.00245)  (0.00412) 
Constant  1.513***  1.451***  1.316**  1.519***  1.603***  1.426** 
  (0.255)  (0.342)  (0.596)  (0.350)  (0.315)  (0.529) 
             
Observations  50  50  50  50  50  50 
R-squared  0.793  0.525  0.796  0.773  0.464  0.772 
 
Notes: All specifications are run with regional dummies.  
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Appendix 2: Description of Women’s Rights proxies and Culture 
 
A.  Women‟s Rights ( Source: CIRI Database) 
The components of women's economic rights are equal pay for equal work, free 
choice of profession or employment without the need to obtain a husband or male 
relative's consent, the right to gainful employment without the need to obtain a husband 
or male relative consent, equality in hiring and promotion practices, job security ( 
maternity leave, unemployment benefits, no arbitrary firing or layoffs, etc …), non - 
discrimination by employers, the right to be free from sexual harassment in the 
workplace, the right to work at night, the right to work in occupations classified as 
dangerous and  the right to work in the military and the police force. 
The components of political rights are women's right to vote, their right to run for 
political office, their right to hold elected and appointed government positions, the right 
to join political parties and the right to petition government officials. Finally, women's 
social rights include the right to equal inheritance, the right to enter into marriage on a 
basis of equality with men, the right to travel abroad, the right to obtain a passport, the 
right to confer citizenship to children or a husband, the right to initiate a divorce, the right 
to own, acquire, manage, and retain property brought into marriage, the right to 
participate in social, cultural, and community activities, the right to education, the 
freedom to choose a residence/ domicile, freedom from female genital mutilation of 
children and of adults  without their consult and freedom from forced sterilization. 
 
B.  Culture ( Source: Coyne and Williamson, 2009; Original Source: EVS and WVS 
Database) 
 
TRUST, the first cultural attribute, aims to capture the level of trust among 
individuals. The following question from the survey is used to measure this attribute: 
"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be 
too careful in dealing with people?" The percentage of respondents that answered "Most 
people can be trusted," has been used to capture the level or degree of trust in each 
country.The second component which is considered from WVS and EVS is CONTROL 
which, as mentioned above, measures the extent to which individuals possess freewill. 
The question used to capture this trait is: "Some people feel they have completely free 
choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what we do has no real 
effect on what happens to them.  Please use this scale (from 1 to 10) where 1 means 
"none at all" and 10 means "a great deal" to indicate how much freedom of choice and 
control in life you have over the way your life turns out". By averaging all the individual 
responses and multiplying them by 10, an aggregate control component is determined. 
RESPECT is the third cultural trait which is based on the distinction between 
generalized versus limited mortality. The following question is used to decide the 
importance of respect in a society: "Here is a list of qualities that children can be 
encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important?  
Please choose up to five".  Respect is defined as the percentage of respondents in each 
country that mentioned the quality "tolerance and respect for other people," as being 
important. OBEDIENCE is the fourth and final trait and question measuring respect is 
also utilized in capturing the level of obedience in a society. It is measures as the 
percentage of respondents within a country answering that obedience is an important 
quality for children to learn. The proxy for culture is constructed by summing Trust, 
Control, and Respect and subtracting the Obedience score.      15 





Variable Name  Source  Definition 
     
Women‟s Economic Rights  The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset  Described in Appendix (1) 
Women‟s Economic Rights  The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset  Described in Appendix (1) 
Women‟s Economic Rights  The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset  Described in Appendix (1) 
Informal Institution/ Culture 
World Value Survey(WVS) and European Value Survey 
(EVS)  Described in Appendix (1) 
Democracy  Polity IV Database  An index ranging from 0 to 10 based on the competitiveness of political participation, the openness 
and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive 
Initial Schooling 1960 and 1970   Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Schleifer (2004)  Log of initial years of schooling of the years 1960 and 1970.  
Initial Executive Constraints 1960 
and 1970 
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Schleifer (2004) 
(Original Source: Jaggers and Gurr, 1996) 
Measure of the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of the chief 
executive. 
Autocracy   Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Schleifer (2004)  This variable ranges from zero to two where higher values equal a higher degree of autocracy. 
Democracies are coded as 0, bureaucracies (dictatorships with a legislature) are coded as 1 and 
autocracies (dictatorship without a legislature) are coded as 2.  
     
     
     
Population  World Development Indicators (2006)  Total Population 
GDP per capita  World Development Indicators (2006)  Gross Domestic Product per capita in constant 2000 dollars 
Growth   World Development Indicators (2006)  Growth rate of Gross Domestic Product 
Religious Affiliations  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny (1999)  Percentages of Muslims and Roman Catholics for different countries in 1980. 
 
     
     
     
     
     
     